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Background: The study analyzes penalties imposed on organizations for breaching safety and health
regulations. The research questions are as follows: what are the commonly breached safety and health
regulations? How proportional are penalties imposed on organizations for breaching health and safety
regulations in the United Kingdom?
Methods: The study employed sequential explanatory mixed research strategies for better understanding
of health and safety penalties imposed on organizations. Actual health and safety convictions and
penalties data for 10 years (2006 to 2016) were obtained through the United Kingdom Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) public register for convictions. Overall, 2,217 health and safety cases were analyzed
amounting to total fines of £37,179,916, in addition to other wide-ranging penalties. For thorough un-
derstanding, eight interviews were conducted with industry practitioners, lawyers, and HSE officials as
part of the study qualitative data.
Results: Findings show that the Health and Safety at Work (HSW) Act accounted for 46% of all HSE
prosecution cases in the last decade. This is nearly half of the total safety and health at work prosecu-
tions. Moreover, there is widespread desire for organizations to comply with the HSWAct, but route fines
are seen as burdensome and inimical to business growth.
Conclusion: A key deduction from the study reveal significant disproportionality concerning penalties
imposed on organizations for breaching safety and health regulations. On aggregate, small companies
tend to pay more for health and safety offenses in a ratio of 1:2 compared to large companies. The study
also reveals that the HSW Act accounted for nearly half of the total safety and health at work prosecu-
tions in the last decade.
 2018 Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the last five decades, various organizations were prosecuted
for breaching safety and health at work regulations; albeit, the
same period witnessed the most stringent and enforced safety and
health at work regulations. However, the last 10 years is of para-
mount interest concerning penalties imposed on organizations for
breaching safety and health at work regulations in the United
Kingdom because of eye-watering fines levied on offenders. From
government and regulation viewpoint “fines imposed for health
and safety failures must be high enough to make a difference to a
company and to make all concerned sit up and take notice” [1]. But
a complex safety and health penalties landscape seems to beewa), ab2038@coventry.ac.uk (S. T
afety and Health Research Institute
c-nd/4.0/).evolving, considering recent astronomical one million pounds
(£1M) penalty imposed on Watling Tyre Service Ltd, a small and
medium enterprise (SME) engineering company, for breaching the
UK Health and Safety at Work (HSW) Act 1974; a case that
confirmed failure to safeguard health and safety of both employees
and nonemployees at work [2]. This case sent a shock wave to all
practitioners and legal luminaries because in the past it was only
large organizations with high commerciality and capability that
often attracted huge health and safety fines to a turn of a million
pounds (£1M) for wrongdoings. Some analyst argued that in recent
times the United Kingdom has “routinely seen health and safety
fines over £1 million; whereas, in the past it was only very high-
profile cases such as rail/airplane crashes, multiple fatalities, andheophilus), aa5876@coventry.ac.uk (A. Ifelebuegu), pf1@bolton.ac.uk (P. Farrell).
, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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(BP) Plc’s Gulf of Mexico disaster which attracted huge fines” [3].
Arguably, excessive safety and health penalties have direct im-
plications on small organizations that may not have the financial
“shock-absorbers” to cushion the impact of seismic safety pen-
alties; thus, small businesses must brace up for positive safety and
health culture. Besides, SMEs are dominant entities in major in-
dustries such as construction, mining, etc; yet these categories of
businesses are 10 times more likely to be prosecuted for breaching
health and safety offenses [4]. For example, in Europe, three out of
10 SMEs often go out of business after being hit with health and
safety fines [5]. Indeed, adverse effects of safety and health at work
on small companies are not far-fetched because of their slim profit
margin. Some legal practitioners are of the view that centring
health and safety penalties on a company’s turnover creates
inconsistency, possibly the biggest blunder in our time [6]. In an
article titled ‘The fine gap in deterrence’ [7], the author argued that
studies concerning proportionality, trend, and in-depth appraisal of
penalties regarding safety and health at work are rare. Thus, this
study seeks to review penalties imposed on small and large orga-
nizations for breaching safety and health regulations in the United
Kingdom.
On the other hand, there is need to examine whether exorbitant
fines imposed on organizations in recent times for breaching health
and safety rules actually deter businesses to act unsafely. This is
imperative because too often organizations fined for breaching
safety regulations in the past were subsequently involved in
adverse safety incidents [8]. For example, in the last decade, many
companies such as Balfour Beatty Plc, British Petroleum (BP) Plc,
Muller (UK) Ltd, Merlin Entertainment Group Ltd, etc were
consistently fined eye-watering amounts for various health and
safety breaches. Coincidentally, these same companies were sub-
sequently involved in reoffending. The reality remains that every
accident is preventable; therefore, harm risk resulting from safety
and health failures should be punished appropriately. However, the
nature of some safety incidents show that accidents can and do
occur regardless of due diligence.
2. Materials and Methods
Empirical data relating to fines and penalties imposed on or-
ganizations for breaching safety and health regulations are scarce.
Yet, there is need for thorough understanding of research in this
area of study because the burden of health and safety on businesses
can be enormous if not properly managed [8]. The UK government
appears to recognize this assertion when the former UK Prime
Minister David Cameron stated that “the UK government will ease
health and safety encumbrance on small businesses,. the burden
of health and safety red tape suffocates many small businesses
.we are determined to kill off the health and safety lousy
compensation culture and address the fear from businesses of be-
ing sued for trivial excessive claims” [8]. Arguably, recent hikes in
health and safety fines appear to be a complete departure from
earlier promises made by the government.
Indeed, harm risked for breaching of health and safety duty
ought and should be punished adequately. Fear of prosecution and
its resultant financial consequences for noncompliance to health
and safety regulations are the main reason for fewer accidents
[9,10]. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) [11] stress that “safety
does not come about by accident: most accidents happen because
they have not been prevented”. The Occupational Health and Safety
Administration [12] is of the view that the major reasons for
noncompliance with safety in most countries is because of frail rule
of law, a weak prosecution system, and a focus on profit maximi-
zation. It is often the case that without good legal systems in placebusinesses will be less willing to comply with standard health and
safety norms, mainly due to financial gain [13].
In an article titled ‘Step by step to record fines’ [3], the author
argued that though there is a reasonable reduction in workplace
injuries and fatalities across industries; significant casualties still
exist in workplaces due to unsafe acts [3,14]. Perhaps, the new
health and safety sentencing guideline introduced by the UK gov-
ernment in February 2016 was designed to increase fines and to
send deterrent message to offenders. Arguably, “sentencing health
and safety offenders in the United Kingdom has always been
disproportionate, yet lawyers and practitioners struggled to un-
derstand consistency of health and safety fines” [15]. From a legal
viewpoint, establishing liability and associated fines for health and
safety offenses appears to be more difficult compared to other
criminal and civil cases. The quest by practitioners and legal lu-
minaries to make certain “assessment of offender’s culpability,
offense category, and the harm risked for breaching health and
safety duty is generally deemed imprecise. Perhaps, it is due to
offense classification and reference to the offender’s financial
means including consideration of aggravating and mitigating fea-
tures of the offense” [15]. On the contrary, it maybe that the new
health and safety sentencing rules in the United Kingdom, will shift
punitive measures imposed on offenders from an art to a science.
2.1. Health and safety legislations in the United Kingdom
Health and Safety regulations in the United Kingdom can be
traced back to 1970s. However, the recent health and safety
sentencing guidelines 2016 appear to focus on fines and safety
regulations [16]. The UK’s new sentencing guidelines for health and
safety offenses, corporate manslaughter, and hygiene offenses
apply to individual and organizations irrespective of date of offense,
and it could be argued to be solely responsible for the recent hike in
health and safety fines. Moreover, the new sentencing guidelines
rely mainly on offense classification that automatically flows into
tables that specify a range of penalties based on health and safety
offender’s financial capabilities [16].
Apart from the new regulation, other health and safety regula-
tions in the United Kingdom are centered on participation and re-
sponsibility of duty holders (clients, employers, and workers)
concerning work-related duty of care. Some UK health and safety
regulations are:
1. Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (1998);
2. Work at Height Regulations (2005);
3. Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations (1998);
4. Management of HSW Regulations (1999);
5. Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (2002)
(COSHH): require employers to assess the risks from hazardous
substances and take appropriate precaution;
6. Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences
Regulation (1995) (RIDDOR);
7. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act,
(2007);
8. The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations (CDM,
2007).
According to HSE [16], these regulations are put in place to help
mitigate ill health and accidents in the workplace.
2.2. Health and safety prosecutions in the United Kingdom
In recent times “law courts are increasingly willing to impose a
high fine on safety offenders where there is minimal injury. thus
the need to understand proportionality of health and safety fines”
Table 1
Average unadjusted health and safety fines per industry in 2009/10 adapted from
Fidderman (2014)
HSE industry classification Average unadjusted fines
per offense in 2009/10
Agriculture £9,633
Construction and related industry £10,622
Services £18,509
Manufacturing £19,761
Extractive and utility supply £20,273
Mean score £15,760
Total £78,798
HSE, Health and Safety Executive.
Saf Health Work 2018;9:388e397390[7]. A breakdown of health and safety fines obtained from HSE
(2011) public register of convictions show that the construction
industry alone accounted for 27% of health and safety breaches
compared to four main sectors such as extractive/utility supply 2%;
agriculture 3%; services 33%, and manufacturing 35%. The unad-
justed average in court fines by industries are illustrated in Table 1
for clarity.
Conversely, the average in court unadjusted fines per health and
safety offense shown in Table 1 exclude exceptional fines. For
example, HSE [17] public register for health and safety convictions
average exceptional fines in the extractive and utility supply in-
dustry in 5 years to 2009/10 ranged from £17,059 to £747,868.
Though, in the same year, there was one fine that amounted to £15
million. Obviously, exceptional fines make it difficult to corroborate
why some health and safety cases attract higher fines. Overall,
available HSE health and safety convictions data for 2015/16 show
that extractive/utility supply and manufacturing industry appears
to attract higher fines, while construction and agriculture recorded
slightly lower fines [7]. Table 2 shows the 2015/16 average unad-
justed health and safety fines per industry. The table reveals a
similar trend (with a slight increase) in average unadjusted fines
when compared to Table 1.
Largely, HSE [18] data reveal a slight reduction in the number of
health and safety cases/breaches in court, but individual and
exceptional health and safety fines increased significantly from
2015 to 2016. For example, the recent £1 million penalty levied on
SMEs companies such as Watling Tyre Services Ltd and the record
£5 million fine imposed on Merlin Attractions, the owners of Alton
Towers, UK, for safety breaches are clear indications of how the
landscape of health and safety fines has changed. Large companies
are not immune from the wave of new fines. Companies such as
Scottish Power Generation Ltd, Balfour Beatty, and ConocoPhilips
(UK) Ltd were recently fined over £1 million each for two separate
health and safety offenses. The proportionality of these fines vis-a-
vis gravity of offense remains unsubstantiated. Similarly, the sym-
metry between health and safety fines and use of insurance to
cushion adverse effects remain uncorroborated.Table 2
Average unadjusted health and safety fines per industry in 2015/16
HSE industry classification Average unadjusted fines
per offense in 2015/16
Agriculture £8,902
Construction and related industry £10,061
Extractive and utility supply £21,273
Manufacturing £19,118
Services £17,904
Mean score £15,452
Total £77,258
HSE, Health and Safety Executive.However, a clear contrast in recent fines can be drawn from the
leisure giant Merlin Attractions operations who were fined
£350,000 in April 2012 over the death of a 72-year-old man who
was tripped over by a parapet wall at work [14]. Then, four and half
years later in September 2016, the same company was fined £5
million over failing to adequately manage the Smiler rollercoaster
in Alton Towers Park; which left 16 people injured [14]. The huge
increase in fines noticed in recent times appears to be deliberate,
systemic, and wholly attributed to the UK’s new sentencing
guidelines that came into force in February 2016. On the other
hand, lawyers and practitioners are concerned that the UK’s law
courts hasty demand and reliance on company’s turnover may also
contribute to a disproportionate hike in fines [15,19]. Many safety
and health at work observers argued that “there is a need to start
thinking of alternatives to high fines;. just because a company has
a large turnover does not mean that it is profitable” [14].
2.3. Health and safety offense prosecutions by legislation in the
United Kingdom
Fundamentally, the main UK health and safety law is the HSW
Act 1974; this act set out general duties that employers will follow
or rely upon in dealing with employees and members of the public
[17]. The general duties under the Health and Safety Act 1974 rely
mainly on principle of “so far it is reasonably practicable”. This
means that employers do not have to take measures to avoid or
reduce the risk if they are technically impossible, excessively
problematic, or the cost of the measures would be grossly dispro-
portionate to the risk. Essentially, what the law requires concerning
the Health and Safety Act 1974 is good management and common
sense [20]. This piece of legislation compels employers to assess
likely risks in the workplace that could cause harm to health and
safety of employees and third parties and to take sensible measures
to tackle them.
Notwithstanding, a review of health and safety prosecutions in
the UK construction industry shows that, offenses under the
HSW Act accounted for 46% of all HSE prosecution cases between
2010 and 2015. Similarly, HSW Act also accounted for £8,954,043
out of £11,625,312 total fines imposed on organizations for
breaching the regulation in the same year [7]. Breach to the HSW
Act and its associated fines are common because offenses relating
to general duties appear to be more serious than specific regulatory
breaches [7].
Moreover, the available data reveal that 230 health and safety
convictions were recorded for the construction industry alone in
2016 [20]. Unsurprisingly, 34% of recorded offenses were
committed under the HSW regulations, attracting total fines
amounting to £6,181,060, with 19 prison sentences. Other fines
associated with health and safety regulations in 2016 according to
HSE [20] archive are the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regula-
tions 1998 resulted in 22% convictions, with total fines amounting
to £18,410 and 31 prison sentences and the Construction (Design
and Management) Regulations 2015 attracted 17% total fines
amounting to £1,883,635, with three prison sentences.
The Work at Height Regulations 2005 leads to 16% convictions,
with total fines amounting to £860,486 and five prison sentences.
Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012 resulted to 4.65% convictions,
with total fines amounting to £11,300 and four prison sentences;
the Cooperate Manslaughter regulation led to 0.80% convictions
with two prison sentences and no option of fines. The Lifting Op-
erations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 resulted in 4.65%
convictions, total fines amounting to £2,500 with no prison sen-
tences; the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulation 1998
brought 0.80% convictions, total fines amounting to £30,000 with
no prison sentences. Driving at Work Regulation 1997 and
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lations 2013 combined lead to 0.80% convictions, total fines
amounting to £5,300 with no prison sentences.
2.4. Theory of increasing penalties for offenders
Generically, it is difficult to find theories that link penalties
imposed on organizations for breaching safety and health regula-
tions; however, taking themost optimistic view the “Simple Theory
of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders” propounded by Miceli
and Bucci [21] is somewhat linked to the study subject matter. This
theory offer explanation to rising penalties considered in the
context of wage discount associated with conviction that arise from
prosecution.
The theory considers a population of risk neutral offenders who
breaks established laws/regulations in consecutive two periods on
the assumption that an offender receives a private return of “b”
amount of money from each act of offense committed and subse-
quently face an expected penalty (fines) that depends on the
probability of apprehension “p” and a sanction that is potentially
dependent on their conviction record. The theory is also predicated
on a second assumption that on a precise note, if a first-time
offender in a specific period is subject to a sanction “S1” (i.e.,
finesmeasured inmonetary terms) and the same offender is caught
reoffending in a different period (i.e., caught committing another
offense), the offender will be subject to another sanction S2.
Based on the above supposition, the sanction that deters
rational offenders is then expressed in a reverse sequence. Thus, a
mathematical expression can be derived as shown below. The key
assumption behind the expression below is that an offender ex-
pected return from breaching regulations (or for committing a
crime) is bps1, while punishment (or penalties) for acting legally
is y. The offender is therefore deterred if:
Y > b ps1
or if
S1 
b y
p
On the other hand, if an offender has history of reoffending his
expected return for committing a crime say in period two is
bps2 then sanction for breaching regulation will be yε. There-
fore, an entity will be deterred for breaching regulation if
yε  bps2.
bþ ε y
p
s2 
As noticed, the lower bound of equation S2 is larger compared to
S1. This simply reflects inferior labor market opportunities for
convicted entities for breaching rules and regulations. But there is
need to take account of irrationally committed offenses in period
two with a probability called “a” regardless of their period.
Therefore, rational offender income for breaching rules and regu-
lations in period one can be calculated as:
b ps1 þ ð1þ aÞðy pεÞ þ a
h
b p2s2  pð1 pÞs1
i
:
where pε is the expected wage penalty, while the term in square
brackets is the expected return from irrational offenses in period
two (in addition to consideration for offender’s period one
behavior). Conversely, an offender’s expected lifetime income for
acting legally in period one is y þ (1a)yþ a(bps1). The expected
cost of punishing first-timers is thus p[a(1a)þa2(1p)]s1, while
the expected cost of punishing repeat offenders is p2a2s2.Therefore, the total cost (TC) across the two periods and
simplifying yields:
TC ¼ pað2 paÞS1 þ p2a2s2
differentiating (TC) in lines with (s2, s1) we have:
ds2
ds1
¼ ð2 paÞ
paÞ < 0
S1* ¼
b y
p
and S2* ¼
bþ ε y
p
where key assumptions considered in this theory are as follows:
since P is fixed, cost of apprehension is assumed to be fixed cost in
each period. Therefore, it was ignored in the derivation of the for-
mula. Another assumption is that society and offender weigh the
cost of punishment equally; otherwise if different costs
are attached differently, as is likely to be true for prison situation. In
this case, it will call for additional weighting factor [22]. Never-
theless, this factor was ignored because it has no impact in the
conclusion of the model.
A key deduction from the theory of increasing penalties for of-
fenders is that most studies find no rationale for rising penalties;
thus, such studies only provide qualified or qualitative explanations.
This theory however provides quantitative explanation based on the
existence of wage penalty suffered by offenders or entities that
breach rules and regulations. The theory makes sense considering
observed pattern of penalties on most penal codes (especially
breaching of health and safety offenses in the United Kingdom) that
demonstrates rising sanction for new and repeat offenders in Sec-
tion 2.2 of the study. Health and safety breaches and resultant fines
relating to leisure giantMerlin Attractions Plc and Alton Towers Park
cited in Section 2.2 are clear demonstration that the theory of
increasing penalties for repeat offenders hold true or valid.
3. Research methods
The study research paradigm is hinged on pragmatism because
the research problem focuses on practicality that seeks to deter-
mine the current trend concerning health and safety fines. A
pragmatic paradigm provides an underlying philosophical frame-
work for mixed methods research [23,24]. The multimethods
research design used QUAN-QUAL concept [25], meaning that
quantitative method is the lead data collection instrument while
qualitative data are used to support and validate the quantitative
findings. The study adopted sequential explanatory type of mixed
methods design strategies because the qualitative inquiry is
designed to assist in explaining and interpreting the study quan-
titative findings, as illustrated in Sections 3.6 and 4.0. Ethical
approval was granted by Coventry University and aimed at
reviewing study participant care against predefined criteria.
3.1. Research questions, study key assumptions, and hypotheses
The main aim of the study is to appraise penalties imposed on
large and small organizations for breaching safety and health at
work regulation in the United Kingdom. The research questions
are as follows: what are the most commonly breached safety and
health regulations in the United Kingdom? How consistent are
penalties imposed on organizations for breaching health and safety
regulations? The following hypotheses (H1 and H2) in Table 3 were
set to allow for better understanding of the study variables. The
hypotheses are underpinned by theory of increasing penalties for
repeat offender discussed in Section 2.4, relating to rational and
Table 3
Study key assumptions and hypotheses
S/No. Null hypothesis H1 Alternate hypothesis H2
1 There is no significant difference between specific safety and health
regulation and penalties imposed on large and SMEs companies
There is significant difference between specific safety and health
regulation and penalties imposed on large and SMEs companies
2 Penalties imposed on entities for breaching health and safety
regulations are not proportional when similar rules are contravened
Penalties imposed on entities for breaching health and safety
regulations are proportional when similar rules are contravened
SMEs, small and medium enterprises.
Saf Health Work 2018;9:388e397392irrational offender’s income for breaching rules and regulations in
specific period as discussed in Section 2.4.
To effectively measure and test these hypotheses, the study uses
10 years of health and safety prosecution (convictions) and com-
panies’ financial data to conduct series of statistical tests.
3.2. Study location and population sample
All data collected for this study relate to health and safety and
financial performance of organizations in the United Kingdom. Pros-
ecution data collectedwere based on the HSE five broad categories of
industries namely: (i) agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; (ii)
construction; (iii) extractive industries, utilities, sewerage, waste
management, and remediation activities; (iv) manufacturing; and (v)
services. The population sample of interviewees comprises of com-
panies’ directors, senior health and safety officer, project/construc-
tion/commercial managers, and lawyers.
3.3. Data collection technique
Two distinctive data sets (quantitative and qualitative) were
collected and used for analysis. For thorough understanding of the
research problem, the study relied on 10 years (2006 to 2016)
health and safety convictions data obtained from the HSE public
convictions records and companies’ financial performance data
from Companies House (UK) Ltd. For consistency, all the data
collected cuts across the HSEmain industry categories stated above.
However, the construction industry data were filtered and subse-
quently used for analysis because the data represented a good
spectrum of both large and SMEs convictions data. Moreover, the
construction industry is generally perceived to be dangerous, with
a high rate of health and safety convictions [26].
Therefore, a cross-sectional analysis of construction companies’
convictions (fines) data and subsequent financial performance re-
cords were examined to ascertain proportionality of fines vis-à-vis
gravity of offenses. A total of 2217 companies’ data concerning
health and safety convictions and fines were collected via the UK
HSE public conviction register. In addition, 52 financial perfor-
mances (profit and loss account) of various companies were
collected to facilitate a robust analysis concerning proportionality
of health and safety fines and its impact on an organizationsTable 4
Five years’ summary of UK construction industry health and safety prosecution data 200
Category of construction
companies/individual prosecuted
for various health and safety offenses
No. of cases
2007
No. of cases
2008
No. of cases
2009
Large companies 7 11 8
SMEs 133 106 105
Individual cases 41 39 25
Total number of cases 181 156 138
Mean of total fines 13,926 16,677 14,585
Total amount of fines 2,534,576 2,618,337 2,027,257
SMEs, small and medium enterprises.performance. The quantitative data were subsequently categorized
into case/breach reference numbers, defendant’s name, hearing
date, result of court (case) outcome, fine imposed on defenders, and
health and safety act/regulation breached as shown in Appendix A.
In the secondphaseof the study researchmethods, semistructured
interviews were conducted with eight industry practitioners in the
following order: two companies’ directors; two health and safety
managers, one project manager in the construction industry, one
commercial manager in the transportation (rail) industry; and two
lawyers with a specialty in industrial accidents. The qualitative data
collectedwere used to support and validate the quantitative findings.
A nonprobability and purposive sampling method was adopted for
interviews. The study participants were professionals with over 8
years working experience in the United Kingdom.
The interviewees were from the private sector and quasi-
government organizations. Face-to-face interviews were conduct-
ed with professionals. The interview questions were pilot-tested
with academics and industry practitioners in managerial capacity.
The purpose of the pilot study was to ascertain whether the
interview questions and instructions were clear, unambiguous, and
to see if participants would find the questions appropriate. Ques-
tions that were improper were removed or reconstructed. Study
participants preferred to be anonymous. As a precaution, all infor-
mation linked to individuals and organizations that participated in
the study was removed. The interview data were subsequently
analyzed using Nvivo 10 software to filter and sort findings. Data
from interviews were recorded using an audiotape recorder and
subsequently transcribed for clarity.
3.4. Data analysis
All quantitative data obtained were entered into XLSTAT 2016
spread sheet using standardized data entry protocol. XLSTAT 2016
software was then used to conduct correspondence, principal co-
ordinate, and Z test statistical analysis. The purpose of Z test is to
determine hypothesized difference (. i.e., proportionality) of health
and safety penalties with regard to health and safety breaches.
Construction industry HSE prosecution and convictions data
covering 10 years (2006 to 2016) were categorized into size of or-
ganizations, number of cases per year, imprisonment/suspended
sentences, etc as illustrated in Tables 4 and 5.7 to 2011
No. of cases
2010
No. of cases
2011
Imprisonment/
suspended
sentences
Five years
average
Total amount
of health and
safety fines in
5 years (£)
7 8 0 8 41
103 99 27 109 546
19 20 40 29 144
129 127 67 146 731
12,587 21,589 34 15873 79,364
1,636,296 2,763,370 d 2,315,967 11,579,836
Table 5
Five years’ summary of UK construction industry health and safety prosecution data 2012 to 2016
Category of construction
companies/individual prosecuted
for various health and safety offenses
No. of cases
2012
No. of cases
2013
No. of cases
2014
No. of cases
2015
No. of cases
2016
Imprisonment/
suspended
sentences
Five years
average
Total amount of health
and safety fines
in 5 years (£)
Large companies 5 8 9 8 7 0 7 37
SMEs 104 110 108 187 172 42 136 681
Individual cases 31 19 29 26 51 40 31 156
Total number of cases 140 137 146 221 230 82 175 874
Mean of total fines 16,578 15,579 22,411 27,540 38,793 41 24,180 120,901
Total amount of fines 2,337,538 2,411,653 5,428,887 6,111,751 9,310,251 d 5,120,016 25,600,080
SMEs, small and medium enterprises.
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increase in health and safety fines. Total average fines of £2,315,967
were recorded from 2007 to 2011 periods compared to £5,120,016
from 2012 to 2016 period. These figures represent an approximate
ratio of 1:2. Moreover, there is no particular pattern in terms of
numbers of health and safety cases per annum. Average and total
health and safety fines figures denote exponential increase as
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Using XLSTAT 2016 software the construction industries health
and safety conviction data was further categorized into three broad
classes: large companies, SMEs and individual convictions as
illustrated in Table 6.
Further statistical tests were conducted using XLSTAT 2016
software to ascertain the degree of proportionality of health and
safety fines imposed on large and SME organizations across in-
dustries as illustrated in Table 7. Health and safety penalty data
(2010 to 2015) were selected at random from HSE five main in-
dustries categories for effective analysis of data.
Table 7 illustrates health and safety fines imposed on both large
and SMEs companies based on selected regulations such as HSW
Act; Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations; Con-
struction (Design &Management) Regulations; Offshore Prevention
of Fire; and Provision and Use of Work Equip Regulations. Z-test
was then conducted using XLSTAT 2016 software. Z test is a sta-
tistical test that comparesmean of two populations and can be used
to ascertain proportionality/consistency of two sets of variables. Z
test formula is express as:
z ¼ ðx1  x2Þ  ðm1  m2Þffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s21
n1
þ s22n2
q
Where -
 1,000,000.00
 2,000,000.00
 3,000,000.00
 4,000,000.00
 5,000,000.00
 6,000,000.00
 7,000,000.00
 8,000,000.00
 9,000,000.00
 10,000,000.00
2006 2008 2A
ve
ra
ge
 a
nn
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
 o
f h
ea
lth
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 fi
ne
s i
n 
th
e 
U
K
 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
in
du
st
ry
Yearly health a
Fig. 1. Trend of health and safets ¼ Population standard deviation
xi ¼ Numbers given in the data
Xx ¼ Mean of the data
n ¼ Total number of items.
Population sample of N ¼ 27 represent total data considered for
proportionality analysis and N ¼ 21 relates to health and safety
breaches concerning HSW Act. The result of XLSTAT analysis is
presented in Table 8 as follows:
Test interpretation for both population sample show that since p
value is greater than the significance level alpha ¼ 0.05, the alter-
native hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the null hypothesis can be
upheld. The meaning of upholding the null hypothesis is that,
penalties imposed on entities for breaching health and safety reg-
ulations not proportional. This test confirms data analysis in
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrating that small companies tend to pay
more for health and safety offenses in a ratio of 1:2.3.5. Financial performance of organizations
Table9 shows average operatingprofits of 25out of 27 companies,
listed in Table 7, that were convicted for various health and safety
offenses from2010 to 2015. Companies’ financial datawere obtained
via subscription to UK Companies House Ltd, in order to obtain
annual financial details such as gross/operating profit and return of
capital employed. There financial data were calculated to establish
relationship between health and safety fines and financial perfor-
mance of both large and SME organizations. Using XLSTAT 2016,
correlation analysis was conducted to ascertain the degree of asso-
ciation between two variables, in this case health and safety fines, (in
Table 7) and average five years’ operating profit (financial perfor-
mance) in Table 9. Correlation coefficients of 0.48 and 0.42 for SMEsR² = 0.6029
010 2012 2014 2016 2018
nd safety trend 2007 to 2016
y fines from 2007 to 2016.
Table 6
Health and safety fines based on category of organizations
Category of construction
companies/individual prosecuted
for various health and safety offenses
Imprisonment/
suspended
sentences
Total amount
of health and safety
fines in five years (£)
Large companies 0 3,218,871
SMEs 27 7,502,899
Individual cases 146 858,066
Total 173 11,579,836
SMEs, small and medium enterprises.
Table 8
Result and interpretation of Z test of proportionality
Test variables Values
Difference 43
z (observed value) 12,056
z (critical value) 1.645
p-value (one-tailed) 0.5
Alpha 0.05
Saf Health Work 2018;9:388e397394and large companies were obtained, respectively. The correlation
coefficient denotes a weak relationship between fines imposed on
SMEs and their financial performance for both categories of com-
panies. However, there is need to consider other factors that directly
influence SMEs financial performance such as poor management,
economic circumstances, training of workforce, etc.
Subsequently, profit margin data of companies in Table 9 was
subjected to correspondence and principal coordinate analysis using
XLSTAT 2016 to understand pair values of financial performance of
companiesfined for health and safetyoffenses. The analysis provided
an opportunity to display interrelational data as points in a quadrant
chart or dimensional space map as illustrated in Fig. 2 below. The
principal coordinate’s analysis return a behavioral value of0.11. The
value indicates that on average companiesfined for breaching health
and safety regulations are likely to have negative operating profit.
3.6. Interviews
There are endless theoretical arguments about validity, often
defined as “truth” or “true knowledge in research” concerningTable 7
Health and safety fines imposed on organizations based on selected regulations
S/No. HSE case/breach reference number Regulation that
led conviction
1 44435350/01 44424570/02 HSW Fatal accid
2 44489050/01 43660340/01 lolE Employee
3 44062050/01 &44213440/01 lolE Employee
4 44072170/01 44435150/01 CO2 poiso
5 44150040/02 HSW Failure to
6 4446740/01 HSW Operative
7 44178570/01 & 44435320/01 HSW Employee
8 44449550/01 & 44254430/01 CDM Unsafe ro
9 44396700/01 & 44065100/01 HSW Design fau
10 44270260/01 & 44405270/02 OPF Failure pr
11 44227070/01 & 43974660/01 HSW Unsafe sy
12 44001270/03 & 44218350/01 HSW Employee
13 44243410/01 & 44271590/01 HSW Failed to p
14 43539020/01 & 44527220/01 HSW Failed to p
15 44413030/01 & 44263590/01 HSW Dead inju
16 44392600/01 & 44285410/03 HSW Death at w
17 44618200/01 & 44460860/02 HSW Failed to c
18 4444407/01 & 44202350/01 HSW Fatality at
19 44397720/01 & 44460860/02 HSW Fatal accid
20 44192660/01 & 44606720/01 HSW Fatal accid
21 44540960/01 & 44435350/01 HSW Fatal accid
22 44628150/01 & 44549600/01 PUWE Fatal accid
23 44430220/04 & 44337430/01 HSW Failed to c
24 44313590/02 & 44394110/01 HSW Fatal accid
25 44491930/01 & 43539020/01 HSW Fatal accid
26 44005060/01 & 44424570/02 HSW Fatal accid
27 44331140/01 & 44498980/01 HSW Fatal accid
CDM, Construction (Design and Management) Regulations; HSW, Health and Safety at
Prevention of Fire; PUWE, Provision and Use of Work Equip Regulations; SMEs, small anqualitative inquiry [27,28]. To avoid philosophical arguments about
validity of qualitative research, the authors accept the standpoint of
Kuzmanic [29] that there is a “pure form of truth” somewhere out
there, which can be discovered through (construct, external, and
internal validity) using appropriate and most importantly valid
research methods. For straightforwardness, the study infers valid
qualitative research to credibly represent different social worlds
(construct) or different interpretations to the readers.
To uphold credibility or true knowledge of the research, validity
was addressed throughout the entire research process, specifically,
in three main areas: production (design of interview questions,
interview process, and recording of the data), presentation (repli-
cability, valid inference, and arrangement of the data) and inter-
pretation (meaningful discussion of data). The interview data were
analyzed using content analysis for easy inferences to antecedents
of discussions between the internees and interviewer, in
addition to effects of communication that transpired concerning
the study subject matter.
For example, interviewees were asked to express their view
concerning penalties imposed on organizations regarding safety
and health offenses in the United Kingdom. Some textual contentsDescription SMEs health and
safety fines
Large companies
health and safety
ent at work 80,400 120,000
death at work 9,000 66,000
death at work 15,000 565
ning 50,000 134,000
prevent a fall 30,000 6,600
trapped beneath concrete 70,000 500,000
fell through a fragile 16,000 500,000
of work 15,000 100,000
lt 15,000 300,000
event fire 166,000 3,000,000
stem of work 45,000 80,000
death whilst at work 25,000 1,000,000
revent a fall 45,000 270,000
rovide safe system 10,000 10,000
ries at work 30,000 100,00
ork 70,000 300,000
omply with HSE 17,500 800,000
work 25,000 1,000,000
ent at work 75,000 120,120
ent leading to amputation finger 120,000 1,800,000
ent at work 10,000 75,000
ent at work 30,000 10,000
omply with HSE 36,120 250,000
ent at work 30,000 100,000
ent at work 5,000 10,000
ent at work 386,000 120,000
ent at work 8,000 50,000
Work; lolE, Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations; OPF, Offshore
d medium enterprises.
Table 9
Average five years’ financial performance of companies fined for unsafe act
S/no. Companies
investigated
2010 profit margin
based on
operating profit
2011 profit margin
based on
operating profit
2012 profit margin
based on operating
profit
2013 profit margin
based on
operating profit
2014 profit margin
based on
operating profit
2015 profit margin based
on operating profit
1 Company 1 d 11.94 11.99 18.27z 5.74z 19.70z
2 Company 2 0.00 0.50 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.10
3 Company 3 23.29 10.11z 12.95 11.92 7.22 4.10
4 Company 4 4.45 6.06 1.54 4.19 1.39 0.24*
5 Company 5 2.96 3.38* 3.38 3.58 3.05 1.60
6 Company 6 0.18 0.50 0.03* 0.14 0.01 0.08
7 Company 7 6.13 2.24* 1.71* 1.57 1.12 0.58
8 Company 8 9.78 1.06y 23.49 6.96 1.13 2.28
9 Company 9 2.45 2.70 1.86z 3.16 3.58y 3.64
10 Company 10 38.31 38.37 27.78 21.60z 31.09 32.00
11 Company 11 0.04 1.39 1.24* 2.60 1.98 1.02
12 Company 12 9.40 8.97z 5.66 12.33 11.45 17.89
13 Company 13 5.11 5.14 0.25z 0.29* 1.74 1.51*
14 Company 14 5.04 5.03 3.32z 2.97 3.18 2.59
15 Company 15 5.42 7.27 5.58* 2.04 10.48 8.93
16 Company 16 2.32y 7.86 11.65 4.57 10.49 9.36
17 Company 17 2.18 0.22* 0.22 1.47 1.43 0.05
18 Company 18 1.84 2.04 1.78 1.94z 0.21z 0.63
19 Company 19 1.48 1.42 1.08 2.26 0.47* 0.95
20 Company 20 0.48 0.67 1.82* 25.31 15.12z 8.95
21 Company 21 1.03 2.13 0.99 0.02 0.800* 0.91
22 Company 22 0.074* 0.45 0.41 0.25 0.23 0.79
23 Company 23 4.52 3.94 3.65 1.74* 2.25* 2.07
24 Company 24 18.88 5.25 0.36* 0.30z 6.43 6.16
25 Company 25 2.80 3.49 0.40y 1.19 2.43 0.34
* Companies with exceptional items deducted in profit/loss account.
y Companies with exceptional items costs deducted and huge amount of overhead deduction.
z Companies prosecuted/fined for health and safety breaches and have ‘exceptional items’ costs deduction.
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Nvivo 10 software, and coded using key study themes) are subse-
quently trimmed for better understanding and spontaneity of the
interaction between the researcher and the study participants.
Some textual excerpts are expressed verbatim; as illustrated below
for confirmability and better understanding of participants’ views.Obs1
Obs2
Obs3
Obs4 Obs5
Obs6
Obs7
Obs8
Obs9
Obs10
Obs11
Obs12
Obs1
Obs15
Obs16
Obs17
Obs18 Obs19
Ob
Obs21
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Fig. 2. Behavior of operating profits of companies co“. recent penalties concerning health and safety offensces are
mind-boggling. perhaps right time to start thinking of alterative
punitive measures . " (Director of a Medium Size Company d
Croydon London UK).
"... we have routinely seen eye-watering health and safety fines ....
burden of health and safety is huge on businesses .... at the same3
Obs14
s20
Obs22
2 3 4
8 %)
d F2: 46.62 %)
nvicted for health and safety offenses.
Saf Health Work 2018;9:388e397396time businesses will not take safety seriously without stiff rule and
retaliatory measures" (Officer of Health and Safety Executive).
“. current safety development means entrepreneurs need to tread
cautiously ... financial outcomes of safety incidents are unpredict-
able . hike in safety fines are purely intentional and a clear
indication of future and shape of things to come” (Commercial
Manager Rail Company dBirmingham UK).
The extracts above show that professionals interviewed painted
mixed view about penalties associated with health and safety
breaches. Most small company owners are of the view that recent
health and safety penalties are mind-boggling and dispropor-
tionate and practitioners need to be mindful of health and safety
regulations. However, there are some lone voices that appear to
argue that “businesses will not take safety seriously without stiff
rule and retaliatory measures”. Their response was expected
because these categories of interviewees are officers of HSE, the
body that regulates health and safety activities in the United
Kingdom. However, when participants were probed further
regarding consistency of penalties imposed on organizations for
breaching safety and health regulations their answers were wide-
ranging. Some participants’ responses are presented thus:
“... health and safety penalties are not designed to be commensu-
rate with offensces committed. but to send a deterrence message
to offenders. but the rush by judicial systems to rely on turnover
of corporate offenders need to be reviewed ... otherwise recent hike
in fines may be adjudged unfair, impost, and rent seeking” (Senior
Solicitor dlaw firm London).
“... recent penalties or fines are not only disproportionate they are
designed to pierce corporate veil; ... I have seen small companies
with little or no financial shock-absorber go out of business,
because of a single health and safety incident;. I know of a safety
incident that was unavoidable ... yet the company management
paid dearly for it” (Director of a small companyeMilton Keynes
UK).
“.the message is very clear;. if you cannot carry out a job safely
at work don’t proceed with the task; it may cost you 30 times more
than expected profit. . (Health and safety lawyerd London).
“.arguably, legislative requirement for HSWealth and Safety at
Work Act 1974 is broad and wide-ranging . I am not surprised
that it is the most commonly breached safety regulation in the UK
. (Project Manager SME Scaffolding companydBirmingham UK)4. Discussion
A common deduction from the study shows that the HSW Act
accounted for 46% of all HSE prosecutions in the last decade to
2016; this single Act is responsible for nearly half of the total safety
and health at work prosecutions. This finding is in line with the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guid-
ance [30] and asserts that safety performance is likely to be
retarded in high risk industry, where there are weak health and
safety rules. Perhaps, legislative requirement for this Act are
burdensome and wide-ranging for most vulnerable organizations.
Also, finding from the study shows exponential increase in safety
and health penalties as illustrated in Fig. 1. Majority of the study
participants are of the view that entrepreneurs need to understand
recent development about safety penalties and tread cautiously in
carrying out their daily duties. Legal experts interviewed were
emphatic that health and safety penalties are not designed to be
proportionate (or commensurate) with offenses committed but to
send a deterrence message to offenders.The study literature suggested that the UK new sentencing
guidelines and law courts reliance on business entities’ turnover
and commerciality are somewhat responsible for the significant
hike in fines. Though, there is the need to bear in mind that the
procedure behind issuing of health and safety fines to a certain
degree is not an exact science rather an imprecise art. The study
reveals inconsistency in penalties levied on SMEs compared to large
organizations. Thus, small businesses are perceived to be seemingly
squeezed and constrained by excessive safety and health at work
penalties.
The study identified some siren voices that believe “recent safety
and health penalties breaks decent companies . they are not only
disproportionate but designed to pierce the corporate veil .
perhaps it is the right time to start thinking of alternative health
and safety punitive measures”. However, the nature and pattern of
suggested alternatives to health and safety penalties seem elusive.
There is a need to advance research on affordable SMEs health and
safety insurance scheme and alternatives to costly health and safety
penalties.
The study examined penalties imposed on organizations for
breaching safety and health regulations in the United Kingdom.
For thorough understanding, the study probed two key issues
concerning: what are the most commonly breached safety and
health regulations in the United Kingdom? How commensurate
are penalties imposed on organizations for breaching health
and safety regulations? Available literature reveals that the
HSW Act accounted for nearly half of the total safety and
health at work prosecutions in the last decade. The study
quantitative and qualitative inquiries reveal an upward trend
in health and safety fines as illustrated in Fig. 1; perhaps,
circuitously influenced by turnover, scalability, and commerci-
ality of corporate offenders.
The study also discovered that on aggregate small companies
tend to pay more for health and safety offenses in a ratio of 1:2,
compared to large companies. But there is need to bear in mind
that nine out of 10 (90%) of health and safety prosecutions in the
United Kingdom involves SMEs, and these categories of firms
makes up 97% of companies doing business in high risk sectors of
the economy. Therefore, the multiplier effect of health and safety
fines together with volume of SMEs help explain heavier burden
of health and safety fines on SMEs in the United Kingdom. In
general, large companies predominantly pay more for health and
safety fines on case by case basis. Arguably, the idea of imposing
fines on corporate offenders based on their turnover is likely to
cause disparity in fines and potentially put an entire venture at
risk. Judicial system need to be aware that turnover is not a true
representation of a company’s financial performance. On the
other hand, practitioners often see excessive penalties imposed
on small businesses as persecution as opposed to prosecution,
considering imbalances in fines between large and small busi-
nesses especially when similar safety regulations are breached.
In conclusion, the perception of most legal luminaries is
that health and safety sentencing guidelines and associated fines
levied on offenders are grossly inconsistent and in some cases
high-handed on small organizations. The symmetry between
hikes in penalties and health and safety insurance is likely to
influence the overall cost of running a business. Thus, there is
need for the UK government to review current health and safety
sentencing guidelines in line with economically disadvantaged
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